

## CLASS THEORY AND CLASS POLITICS TODAY

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(to appear in *Socialist Register 2015*)

In the spring of 2013, the BBC unveiled a major survey of the class structure of modern Britain, prepared by a team of sociologists led by Professor Mike Savage of the London School of Economics. The survey sought to broaden the traditional occupational analysis of class by more fully taking into account 'the role of cultural and social processes in generating class divisions', and the authors argued that 'this new seven class model recognises both social polarisation in British society and class fragmentation in its middle layers'.<sup>1</sup>

These two observations -- of polarization and fragmentation -- will certainly strike a chord with any casual observer of social change. In recent years, in many countries around the world, inequality of income, wealth and power has undoubtedly been increasing; for example in Britain, where the rise of inequality has been widely studied, often connecting inequalities of income and wealth to those in health, housing, education and other quality of life issues.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the increasingly complex configurations of class, as understood in the LSE survey, have also been evident. What has traditionally been understood as the working class has been seen by many as fragmenting into layers defined as much by social standing, spending patterns and welfare dependency as by the more traditional attributes of occupation and income.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the middle class has remained, as it has always been, hard to define with any clarity: it includes small business owners, professionals, managers and higher-skilled or supervisory workers across all sectors of the economy, public and private.

The authors of the LSE survey identify their classes in terms of people's experiences, attitudes and lifestyles, and relate these to underlying economic and social trends. Such an approach is attractive because it roots class identity in something common to all of us, namely a life-path that can be mapped out and analyzed, and because the data generated in such a survey can then be subjected to sophisticated statistical analysis. The elements selected for recording are underpinned by a particular conceptual framework, developed some thirty years ago by Pierre Bourdieu.<sup>4</sup> In this approach, individuals are differentiated by their possession of economic, cultural and social capital in different quantities and proportions -- the three forms of capital being in principle independent of each other. The data are then analyzed in order to identify clusters of individuals -- eventually in this case, seven in number -- who broadly share the same economic, social and cultural characteristics.

While such a survey provides an informative snapshot of these clusters, it leaves open the question of what social processes are shaping how we cluster in this way, and how these classes-as-clusters interact with each other.<sup>5</sup> Some of the forces shaping the clusters are treated as distinct, if interacting, and in the final analysis attributable to factors such as technology or resource constraints that are seen as external. However, the survey is in essence a heuristic exercise rather than one of testing distinct hypotheses about social change, and the main outcome is a mapping of how the various observable changes are compatible with each other; it remains very hard to ask really important questions about society as a whole, and how social differentiation changes through time.

But the current renewed preoccupation with class also raises important questions about whether and how we can challenge the present social order. If society is really as fragmented as it immediately appears, what chance can we ever have of once again promoting the progressive ideals of democracy, equality and solidarity pursued by socialists -

- in the broadest sense -- for the last two hundred years? The wider political environment is hardly helpful, given ever-deepening global integration which seems to undermine any sense of local or national political agency; the pervasive fracturing of most if not all societies along lines of gender, race, sexuality and religion; and the looming problem of climate change that threatens the entire relation of humanity with nature. After decades of retreat in the face of such obstacles, the global financial crisis unfolding since 2007 has led to many disparate initiatives across the world, but not as yet to any significant renewal of the left, or at least one sufficiently unified, sustained and widespread to provide cause for real optimism.

On the contrary, whether in the supposedly more advanced rich countries or elsewhere, neither social democracy nor state socialism have been able to withstand the political consequences of the new circumstances, and we have hardly begun to respond creatively. We still too readily turn to the old playbooks, clinging to the belief that the problem does not lie in how we as socialists have translated our political ideals into an effective left politics, but rather in failures of leadership, or deficiencies in our unresponsive fellow citizens. It is indeed hard, these days, to talk about socialism as any kind of real alternative, let alone to map out a politics that can build prefigurative institutions and practices that will in turn persuade others, in meaningful numbers, of the possibility of a better world.

So where do we begin? Surely, we have to campaign on many fronts. The renewed interest in inequality (such as Piketty's *Capital*<sup>6</sup>) is having an impact on public debate in many parts of the world. Sadly, this is not because of a real sea-change in opinion -- let alone political action -- among the public at large, for they display that mix of aspiration and resentment usually attributed to them by the commentariat. Rather, it is largely because to the political élites, whether liberal, social democrat or authoritarian, the gap between rich and poor has grown so wide that they fear aspiration faltering and resentment deepening into disenchantment and revolt -- as much from the 'new middle classes' as from the poor and excluded.

The starting point of this essay is the proposition that the question of class is central, as argued in the preface to last year's *Socialist Register*.<sup>7</sup> This is not because I want in any way to suggest that it must take precedence over other issues; on the contrary, it seems obvious that the counterposing of 'class politics' against 'social movements' has been one of the main obstacles to left renewal now for forty years or more.<sup>8</sup> Instead, in what follows I want to argue that the painful experiences of this whole period can only be resolved through a thorough critique of the ways class has been understood.

In order to do this, I propose first to revisit Marx's original relational understanding of class, and how that understanding was taken up by later generations in the Marxist tradition, especially in the revival of debate about class from the 1960s to the 1980s. In the following sections, I look first at the analyses of the middle classes in relation to Marx's two-class model, in which the New Left sought to respond to claims that their growth had confounded Marx's expectations of social polarization. I then examine the related question of whether in any case the working class was (or still is) a revolutionary subject capable of overthrowing the capitalist order. This, then, sets up the problem of how far class relations can really be understood in relation to labour within capitalist production alone, rather than embracing also labour and other activities taking place elsewhere in society, or what has come to be called the sphere of social reproduction. Here I suggest an alternative understanding of production and labour that can effectively integrate the sphere of reproduction, and provide a better way of deploying class as a critical concept. This approach is then applied in the last section to political practice in the contemporary world, the aim being to shed light on the changes that have taken place in the neoliberal era and the political consequences that now confront us.

Finally, this essay is deliberately open and exploratory in nature. It is futile to imagine that locked within the past contributions of scholars or activists is a key that can unlock a better future. Equally futile is the time-honoured method of argument-by-quotation, with the implicit assumption that every proposition must be justified by appeals to authority, related to the study of time-honoured questions, and deploying approved terminology. That method may safeguard a tradition, but at the cost of reducing still further its appeal to a society that has plainly rejected the failed socialisms of the past.

## CLASS ANALYSIS IN THE MARXIST TRADITION

For Marx there were two great classes in capitalist societies, the capitalist class or bourgeoisie and the working class or proletariat, bound together in the social relation of capital. In this view, capitalists own the means of production, and purchase labour-power from workers with the purpose of increasing their wealth by extracting surplus-value and accumulating it as capital; workers have been dispossessed of direct access to the means of subsistence through self-activity, and therefore must sell their labour-power in order to subsist. The two classes in relation to each other constitute the relations of production in capitalism, which is a historically distinct mode of production that emerges from a pre-existing feudal order undermined by economic, social and technological change. Its own development, in turn, entails a growing economic polarization between the two great classes; this generates a political consciousness uniting the working class in collective action to overturn the capitalist order and usher in a classless society.

This core 'Marxist theory of class' has been challenged and qualified on a great variety of grounds, precisely because it stands at the heart of the political theory and practice of his followers. Theoretically, the two classes and the relationship between them are co-constituted with the concepts of mode of production, relations of production, value, capital, surplus-value, labour process, accumulation -- and necessarily also the forms of law and state that ensure the political rule of the capitalist class. Practically, socialism as a political movement rests on the belief that there exists a common interest across the working class, on which a unity of action can be built, first for resistance and then for revolution; this directs attention to the empirical configurations of class, the determinants of belief and behaviour, and the strategies and tactics of political mobilization.

Before turning to the main critical challenges to the two-class model, it is worth setting out the positive case for it, and especially for the idea of the working class as agent of social change. There is no question that Marx and his successors argued repeatedly that the dynamics of capital accumulation would tend to generate increasing social polarization between capitalists and workers. Even in the first volume of *Capital*, these tendencies find empirical specification in the account of how, after its initial phase of 'primitive accumulation' in which the means of production are appropriated by the rising capitalist class, both the production of commodities and their circulation are transformed by the drive to accumulate. In production, the key argument is that the 'formal' subsumption of labour to capital, in which capitalists assume control of substantively unchanged material production processes based on handicraft methods, tends to be transformed towards a 'real' subsumption of labour, entailing the development of first a detailed division of labour in factory production, and then the application of science and technology to the development of machine-based production. As Braverman, Gorz and others reminded us in the 1970s, this transformation of the capitalist labour process tends to reduce an increasing proportion of the direct labour force within the capitalist workplace to an undifferentiated mass of unskilled (or

more euphemistically ‘semi-skilled’) workers, subjected to the relentless discipline of mechanical or chemical processes designed and policed by capitalist managers.

At the same time, competition in the marketplace reinforces this process. In the labour market, technological change in production, appearing for capital in the form of increased labour productivity, continually leads to reductions in the demand for labour, and thereby a reserve army of labour that depresses wages and undermines attempts to organize opposition on the shop floor. In product markets, competition leads inevitably to the concentration and centralization of capital: the scale of production tends to grow faster than sales, leading to concentration in ever-larger units, while the development of credit and financial markets encourages the centralization of capital through the creation and merger of joint-stock companies.

But do these developments lay the foundations for the self-organization and growth of the working class as a collective actor? The conventional understanding within Marxism has always been that the collective experience of class struggle brings home to workers their shared class interest, encouraging self-organization and political contestation. Marx and Engels themselves left no systematic account of how this might transpire, but their writings abound in concrete analyses of the political activities of the working class, analyses which necessarily can only be undertaken by successive generations in response to the contingencies of time and place. Such contingencies evidently include a vast array of natural, social and cultural factors which stand alongside the reproduction and accumulation of capital, shaping the thinking and the actions of different groups within the working class. It is this unavoidable gap between abstract theory and concrete self-activity that later Marxists summed up in the formula that the ‘class in itself’ had to become a ‘class for itself’ equipped with a collective understanding of their circumstances.<sup>9</sup> This gap can only be navigated by developing and contesting political strategies for overthrowing capitalist rule and ushering in a classless society. It is in this context that the validity of the two-class model has been questioned.

## THE MIDDLE CLASSES

A first important challenge to the two-class model has been the existence of social groups that appear to stand between capital and labour. The empirical existence of ‘middle classes’ was clear to Marx and Engels themselves, and has been the subject of periodic debates ever since.<sup>10</sup>

Capitalism had emerged over a long historical period from societies of a very different kind, building upon components in a social division of labour which was dominated politically by a land-owning ruling class and characterized by its own distinctive relations of production. The transition to capitalism entails the continuing coexistence of earlier institutions, cultures and practices with the emerging capitalist order, and this hybridity is remarkably persistent; but in addition, the spread of capitalism generates rapid economic growth, new patterns of international trade and continuous technological change. These transform the division of labour both in society at large and within workplaces: new occupations arise and old occupations are brought within the scope of capitalist production, not only affecting the make-up of the two new great classes, but also continually generating an ill-defined border zone between them. Furthermore, these complexities are never observable in isolation from the processes of social contestation that accompany the development of capitalism.

Thus in the late nineteenth century, socialists recognized the political importance of both a ‘labour aristocracy’ and a ‘petty bourgeoisie’. The former was made up of workers

organized both to defend the skill-based material privileges that they retained from their artisanal origins, and to establish shop-floor control within the new industries of the second industrial revolution. Their generally higher levels of education and income ensured that they played a disproportionate role in the development of trade unions and social democratic parties, but it was open to such workers to pursue their own interests at the expense of the working class as a whole. This could be achieved both individually through promotion within the workplace,<sup>11</sup> and collectively through maintaining separate ‘craft’ unions and pursuing demarcation disputes against management attempts to deskill their work. As a result, they could be drawn into political alliances with liberal reform. The petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors in industry and commerce, were capitalists by definition, but in the face of market competition and the development of large-scale industry and finance in this period, their position became increasingly precarious, especially at times of economic crisis. As a result, they gravitated politically towards populist alliances with the working class, but on the other hand, political ideologies of nationalism, racism or imperialism could suffice to keep them loyal to the *haute bourgeoisie* and the capitalist state.

Of greater interest in more recent debates have been other intermediate groups, such as managers and technical specialists in capitalist production; independent professionals such as lawyers, accountants, doctors, artists, journalists, clergy, etc.; and managers within the public sector and the state apparatus. There is no question that the occupational groups in question expanded greatly in the twentieth century in the advanced capitalist countries, and indeed in the Soviet bloc and other state-socialist countries also. At the turn of the century, Thorstein Veblen had already identified the potential antagonism between businessmen and engineers in large-scale industry, and the work of Berle and Means and James Burnham in the 1930s launched the idea of the ‘managerial revolution’.<sup>12</sup> By the 1960s, even mainstream economists and sociologists were heralding a ‘post-capitalist’ order based on technical rationality and economic efficiency, and it is hard to find much difference in this respect between the ‘new industrial state’ of J. K. Galbraith and the ostensibly Marxist analysis of ‘monopoly capital’ in the work of Baran and Sweezy.<sup>13</sup>

In relation to these middle class elements, Marxists have followed two main analytical strategies. One strategy is to attribute to these groups, or even by extension the middle classes as a whole, a set of activities and beliefs that seem to define a distinct location within the class structure of capitalism, which then becomes a three-class model. The second is to argue that the various components of the middle classes have no distinct function or purpose, but instead occupy a collectively ambiguous position; rather like the traditional labour aristocracy and petty bourgeoisie, they align with either the capitalist class or the working class, most visibly in periods of crisis. Both strategies were extensively deployed in European and North American debates in the 1960s and 1970s.

A well-known example of the first strategy was the thesis of the professional-managerial class, or PMC, posited in 1977 by Barbara and John Ehrenreich.<sup>14</sup> They distinguished the PMC from the traditional petty bourgeoisie of small proprietors, and included in it a wide range of salaried white-collar workers, including scientists, engineers, managers, public officials, teachers, journalists, accountants, lawyers and the medical professions. Citing E. P. Thompson’s view that class could only be understood as a historical relationship, they argued that the specific class role of the PMC was primarily one of reproducing capitalist social relations. The occupational, educational, social and economic diversity of the PMC was no obstacle to its identification, and in any case no greater than the diversity of the capitalist class or the working class. Its rapid expansion during the post-1945 boom years was closely linked to the consolidation of monopoly capitalism and the expansion of the state, but also to the renewal of middle-class radicalism in the form of the New Left. This allowed the possibility of the PMC becoming a ‘class for itself’, developing a

distinct political voice and purpose, and even potentially taking over the role of revolutionary agency traditionally attributed to the working class. In all respects, this placed the putative PMC of the 1970s firmly in the American progressive tradition. It also stood alongside a growing literature in mainstream US sociology that advanced ‘new class’ theses,<sup>15</sup> as well as echoing parallel thinking among dissident Marxists in Eastern Europe on the role of the intelligentsia.<sup>16</sup>

In contrast to the depiction of the PMC as a distinct if related class, other writers used various arguments to claim either that the occupational groups contained within it were liable to absorption into either the capitalist or the working class, or that they remained unable to cohere into a class-for-itself and were therefore irrelevant to the prospects for revolutionary change.<sup>17</sup> Braverman’s deskilling thesis, though much misrepresented, provided ammunition to the prediction that intermediate groups were liable to undergo the same process of polarization that the original two-class model entailed. After all, the principles that Marx applied to the appropriation of workers’ skills in the development of the capitalist labour process could be applied just as well to mental as to manual workers, and therefore to the various occupations included in the PMC. Since the 1970s, many low- and mid-level technical, professional and managerial occupations have indeed become more routinized, and their workers subjected to the steady erosion of the advantages that they once enjoyed in the labour market. Elements of the process of deskilling long identified in blue-collar work now apply not only to low-level clerical or retail jobs, but also to supposedly higher level jobs. The close monitoring of work processes in graduate professions such as university teaching undermines the traditional ideology of professionalism, creates antagonism between staff and senior management, and encourages traditional responses such as trade union activism.

At the same time, in the higher reaches of the PMC, the once-fêted managerial revolution has very largely been reversed. In the private sector, the revival of shareholder power, the use of stock options and widespread privatization of state enterprises have drawn the highest levels of management firmly into the capitalist class. In the public sector also, the wholesale adoption of management techniques from the private sector has steadily undermined the traditional ideology of public service, installing instead apparatuses of strategic management based on top-down executive hierarchies and financial incentives. This has been accompanied by the outsourcing of everything from policy design through to routine service provision, overseen by growing two-way managerial traffic between the public sector and its private contractors. Today, it would be hard to argue that there exists a class, in the Marxist relational sense, that is distinct from the working class and the capitalist class. The trends that have brought about the demise of the PMC are part of the wider turn to neoliberalism in recent decades, although it could still be argued that there *really was* a nascent PMC in the period from the 1920s to the 1970s.<sup>18</sup>

#### THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE WORKING CLASS AND THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY

If the working class in Marx’s sense can now be understood once more to be overwhelmingly predominant in terms of numbers, it remains the case that the concept of the middle classes is very widely accepted in public debate; and the course of the global crisis since 2008 shows all too clearly how far we are from an effective class-based socialist politics. This brings us to the second critical issue for Marxist class theory, namely the question of agency: can either side of the two-class model really be seen as a historical subject? As far as the capitalist class is concerned, this centres on the historical development of capitalism, and the economic and political processes by which the capitalist class becomes

hegemonic in relation to landed interests as well as subordinate classes. There is a long tradition of debate on divisions within the capitalist class, most notably between industry and finance, as well as on the institutions and practices through which individual capitals or 'fractions' of capital overcome the antagonisms generated by their competitive struggles and arrive at some form of hegemonic strategy to sustain their class rule. Any historical inquiry into these issues unavoidably has to take fully into account the development of the capitalist state, which like class was vigorously debated in the 1970s and 1980s, but more recently has been relatively neglected; the main exception being the focus on the states system in arguments over globalization.<sup>19</sup>

Problematic though the relation between capital and the state remains, however, the question of working-class agency is far more challenging. As noted earlier, the standard formula for this has traditionally been to distinguish between the 'class in itself' and the 'class for itself': while accumulation expanded the ranks of the working class as a structural category and concentrated them in ever-larger production sites, it would then take the active organization of workers to transform them from victims of exploitation into agents of social transformation. This analytical distinction played a crucial part in shaping socialist politics, especially in ensuring the ascendancy of political parties, whether ostensibly reformist or revolutionary, over alternative working-class agencies such as trade unions that focused either on labour market conditions or on workplace struggles. Most damaging to the grassroots political engagement of workers at large was the concept of 'false consciousness', used to justify the elimination of rank-and-file democracy in workers' organizations of all kinds.<sup>20</sup> But although the in-itself/for-itself distinction appears to have been largely rhetorical, it does direct us to the fragmentation of the working class across society at large, as well as the advances that have historically been achieved through party politics.

That the proletariat is differentiated in a great variety of ways is indeed clear, not least in the empirical evidence on which Marx himself drew in analyzing capitalist production in *Capital*. The social division of labour between branches of production, coupled with the technical division of labour within the workplace, means that wage labourers are highly differentiated by location, income, skill and authority, in complex combination with dimensions of difference such as gender, ethnicity and religion whose origins appear to lie outside the capitalist production process as such. In his analysis of the evolution of capitalist production from simple co-operation to manufacture to modern industry, Marx places considerable emphasis on how in the latter two stages the drive to extract relative surplus-value entails the transfer of immediate control over production from workers to capital and its agents.<sup>21</sup> This leads not to the reduction of all to interchangeable general labourers, but to the decomposition of earlier forms of hierarchy and division of tasks and their recomposition as elements, no less hierarchical and diverse, within the collective labourer of developed capitalist production. At the same time, he sees the shedding of employment by large-scale modern industry as providing the basis for a continuous renewal of small-scale and less technically advanced fields of production; for example, the widespread existence of adjunct production formally outside the factory, such as homework in the textiles industry, allows factory owners to transfer to petty producers the financial consequences of periodic crises. Labour shedding constantly feeds into the broader reserve army of the unemployed, but they too are differentiated into what Marx dubs the floating, the latent and the stagnant.

Despite this obvious diversity within the mid-nineteenth century workforce, there is little doubt that traditionally the primary reference point for assessing the unity and cohesion of the working class was the large factory. In his general discussion of the development of machinery in *Capital*, Marx argues that once machine-based production takes hold of an industry, the relation between the workers and their instruments of labour becomes inverted: the worker becomes the adjunct of the machine.<sup>22</sup> With further evolution towards a unified

machinery system, workers are bound together by its preordained rhythm: the collective character of labour confronts the workers as a technical necessity. This vision of increasingly automated flow production reflects the early development of assembly-line technology, which reaches its apotheosis in the early twentieth century in Ford's Highland Park plant and in continuous flow production in the chemical and related industries; it becomes a primary subject for the analysis of modern capitalist production, whether from cheerleaders or critics, as well as a cultural reference point when contrasted with the supposed idyll of artisanal production, as in Fritz Lang's *Metropolis* or Chaplin's *Modern Times*.

In Marxist scholarship, this model of mass production is seen as dramatically accentuating the contradictions of capitalism. The need to valorize vast amounts of fixed capital accelerates the trend towards monopoly, the rise of trusts and cartels aimed at controlling markets; and at the same time, flow production systems make the collective nature of exploitation immediately apparent to the workers involved, encouraging thereby collective resistance on the shop floor and the rise of shop stewards and other forms of bottom-up self-organization. For example, Alfred Sohn-Rethel argued that the contradiction between the normal ebb and flow of price-competitive markets and the requirement of continuity of flow production amount to a 'dual economics of transition', which he identified historically in the support given by German heavy industry to the forms of state coordination and sector planning adopted by the Nazis.<sup>23</sup>

However, as is readily apparent to anyone examining more broadly the nature of capitalist labour processes, very few wage labourers in capitalism actually find themselves subordinated to a machine-based collective process in this way. Even within the engineering industries, heartland of the machine-paced assembly line, at the peak of manufacturing employment in the UK it was estimated that such systems covered only 30 per cent of workers.<sup>24</sup> The reality is that the disposition of labour in the modern workplace is for the most part not shaped by technology into an inflexible form that contradicts the fluidity that money capital seeks. As the pioneers of labour process studies showed in the 1970s, it is shaped by the choices of capitalist management and the resistance, whether individual or collective, of workers.<sup>25</sup> As we have seen only too clearly in recent decades, even the most apparently stable oligopolies, whether in manufacturing or services, are open to fundamental disruption through not only technological change, but also organizational innovations such as the relocation or outsourcing of production; the use of complex incentive schemes; the ever-closer monitoring of production activity through information systems; and above all, the constant and recently all too successful efforts of employers to remove hard-won legal rights from trade unions.

Already in 1986, Peter Meiksins suggested that the debates on class, and specifically the relation between the 'polar' model and the evident vertical and horizontal fracturing of the workforce in capitalism, required that 'the relationship between production relations and specific, historical patterns of class conflict needs to be reconsidered'.<sup>26</sup> Yet with the general decline in interest in class, these adjustments have not taken place, or at least not with the positive outcome that Meiksins hoped for. Indeed, the lack of progress is reflected in the similar call made nearly twenty years later by David Camfield, who draws attention not only to the continuing need to situate classes historically, but also to 'consciously incorporate social relations other than class, such as gender and race'.<sup>27</sup> In the remaining sections I will try to explain this and to suggest ways to begin to effect such changes in theory and in practice, and particularly to overcome the divisions that currently beset us in challenging the present social order.

## CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

While the 1970s debates on the capitalist labour process certainly included consideration of this fragmentation of the working class, the turn to analyzing production and work also coincided with the rise of Marxist and feminist (including explicitly Marxist-feminist) work on the political economy of gender, where an important topic was the role of unwaged household work in capitalism, and more generally the reproduction of labour-power outside the direct production and sale of commodities.<sup>28</sup> One way of looking at reproduction was in terms of the vexed question of productive and unproductive labour, but looking back it is clear that the valiant attempts to sort this out by close study of Marxist texts never got very far. The role of non-wage labour in reproducing capitalism could not be denied, but as with work on the labour process, its critical analysis did not fundamentally transform Marxist theory and analysis as might have been expected.

In a recent essay, Nancy Fraser has sought to explore the reasons why ‘we are living through a capitalist crisis of great severity without a critical theory that could adequately clarify it ... we lack conceptions of capitalism and capitalist crisis that are adequate to our time’.<sup>29</sup> She sees Marx’s analysis as attributing four key features to capitalism: in order of precedence, they are private property, which presupposes the standard two-class division; the free labour market, through which non-capitalists must secure their subsistence and reproduction; the capitalists’ compulsive pursuit of the accumulation of self-expanding value; and the distinctive role of markets, which allocate inputs to commodity production and determine how society’s surplus is invested. This last element, she argues, should not be understood as an ‘ever-increasing commodification of life as such’, because the overall reproduction of capitalist society actually depends on a wide range of activities that do not take place within the production and exchange of commodities.<sup>30</sup> While Marx goes behind the appearance of capitalist markets as equal exchange by finding the secret of exploitation in the hidden abode of production, Fraser identifies social reproduction in abodes that are in turn hidden behind production. She argues that Marx only broaches such issues in his historical introduction to the rise of capitalism in Part VIII of *Capital I*, and we now need to explore these yet-more-hidden abodes. Social reproduction, she argues, is an ‘indispensable background condition for the possibility of capitalist production ... moreover, the division between social reproduction and commodity production is central to capitalism -- indeed, is an artefact of it’.<sup>31</sup> The remainder of her essay then explores these doubly hidden abodes, setting out a range of propositions on their relation to capitalist production and their role in capitalist crisis.

While I sympathize with Fraser’s rejection of the ‘dystopian fantasy’ of ever-increasing commodification, her analysis of Marx ignores some very important elements in his critique of political economy -- elements that, if restored to consideration, do much to soften the impact of her arguments, and point to a different way of placing social reproduction firmly at the heart of the analysis of class and of crisis. Fundamentally, this concerns Fraser’s characterization of Marx’s critique of capitalist production as ‘economic’ in content, and implicitly structural-functionalist rather than historical in method. The four features that she ascribes to Marx are set out in the opening two parts of *Capital*, which are highly abstract in content. However, if we read on into the later parts, we find not only the famous hidden abode of production, but also precisely Fraser’s doubly hidden abodes of social reproduction. There we can find ample evidence that Marx’s critique incorporated concretely not only aspects of the social order that would be understood, in the fragmented obscurity of bourgeois thought, as social, political, cultural or technological, but also the relation of humanity to nature. This is certainly not ‘economics’ as mainstream social science would define it; on the contrary, in discussing issues like the length of the working day, the

forms that wages take in capitalist employment, or the effects of machinery on workplace relations, Marx draws extensively on the concrete experiences of workers, and on the social conditions that they endure at home, in their communities and in their relations with the state.

None of this is to claim that reading *Capital* is all we need to do, that somehow from Marx's brow there sprang forth a complete workshop manual for revolutionaries that would forever suffice us; or indeed that the task he bequeathed to us was simply to write the remaining books which he indicated (in a few casual passages which he himself never revised for publication) would round out the analysis. It is obvious, given the history of the twentieth century, not only that it is impossible to derive a completion from the fetishistic search for truth in Marx's own writings, but also that whole swathes of historical change have occurred which were not visible in Marx's lifetime -- not least, the progress that has been made in addressing sources of oppression that lie outside capitalism as such. But that is precisely why the main benefits to be derived from studying Marx lie in his *method* of inquiry, which is developed in the opening chapters of *Capital* and exemplified not only in the historical account of the closing chapters, but also the chapters of concrete analysis of his own time that lie between.

So how does Marx go about his critique? There is a vast literature on Marx's method available for those who wish to mull over the many ways of answering this question, but I think it really boils down to a few basic principles. First, historical materialism entails locating social inquiry in historical context, using the principle of identifying those institutions, ideas and practices that together constitute distinct ways in which humanity structures its relationship to nature, that is, social reproduction. Social reproduction is indeed the primary purpose of social inquiry, and Fraser is right to privilege it over production insofar as she sees production as a narrowly economic process. Second, the historical thread running through Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production is not to be identified with specific visible features of capitalism (as in Fraser's list of property, free labour, accumulation and markets). Rather, it consists in the possibility of historical transcendence, of humanity developing a conscious and collective self-control, which Marx traces from its most abstract representation in the form of the commodity through to its most concrete historical manifestations in struggles over the organization of social reproduction.

Marx's *Capital* is not built around a historical account of capitalism, but around a critique of political economy, that is, the core ideology of the ascendant capitalist class. At the heart of this ideology, he reasons, lies the concept of the self-regulating market, freed from bondage to sovereign or state, and therefore his analysis begins with the commodity as the object of market exchange. He uncovers first the dual nature of commodities as useful objects (use-value) and as the carriers of exchange-value. He suggests that the exchange of two distinct use-values in definite quantities indicates that they have something in common, namely that they are products of labour. The value of a commodity is the amount of socially necessary labour embodied in it, abstracting from the specific or concrete labour that makes the product useful in meeting social needs. The labour undertaken by a worker in producing a commodity likewise has a dual character, as concrete useful labour, and as abstract value-producing labour, a distinction that is specifically absent in the apologetics of bourgeois political economy. The significance of this is brought out in the section on the fetishism of commodities, where he makes repeated presentations of the point from different perspectives.

This dual character of labour provides the starting point from which Marx elaborates his critique.<sup>32</sup> The elaboration follows a very specific sequence of concepts, first in the sphere of circulation from the commodity to labour to money to capital to surplus-value and exploitation. Then he goes into the sphere of production, where the labour process reproduces not only the commodities that go into it, but also capitalists, the workers and the social relations between them, through the extraction of surplus-value and the subsumption of

labour to capital. Finally, he returns in Part V to circulation, where that surplus-value is realized, distributed and accumulated as capital. The way the analysis unfolds mirrors deliberately the circuit of capitalist production, because that is the reality that lies behind the veil of commodity fetishism, the ‘magic of the market’. Along the way there emerges not only the capitalist, but also the worker; not only individuals pursuing their personal self-interest through free exchange, but capital and labour as social categories and as classes; not only the freedom of the market, but the coercion of the state; not only the apparent and common-sense logic of capital accumulation as organizing the production and sale of useful commodities, but the division of society into exploiters and exploited, the ravaging of communities and of nature, and all the hidden injuries of class.

However, there also appears at every stage of the argument the possibility of a different social order that humanity could establish, not on ideals plucked from the air, but on the basis of negating capitalist commodity production.<sup>33</sup> As a historical mode of production, capitalism contains within it not only the realm of value, the relentless logic that bourgeois political economy represents and tries to naturalize, but also the realm of use-value. In every facet of social production and reproduction, these two realms co-exist: the one driven by the imperative of capital accumulation, and the other by the application of labour time to nature to meet humanity’s transhistorical need for subsistence.

Where does class, in the sense of the two-class model, fit in to this? Surely it is part of the realm of value; and just as surely, the potential for its negation -- a classless society -- lies in the realm of use-value, where concrete useful labour is expended to meet social needs. When Marx’s two-class model is situated within the duality revealed by his critique of bourgeois thought, the historical character of its imposition upon society is revealed, and the possibility of its supercession also. Precisely because the capitalist form of class rule is co-constituted with the realm of value and capital, the starting point for its supercession must lie outside it, in aspects of society that must continue beyond capitalism, albeit in a different form. To envision socialism as a realm of freedom, and develop social practices that can begin to realize it, we have to start from use-values, concrete labour and social needs. This is what the critics of class politics have been arguing for; but it does not require the ditching of Marx’s analysis of capital and class, only its re-interpretation as a critique of political economy rather than as Marxist economics.

## FINDING BRIDGES TO SOCIALISM IN CAPITALISM TODAY

If the investigation of method in the previous section allows us to integrate the politics of production and of reproduction, then equally it can be argued that Marx’s relational model of class, which is historically specific to capitalism, is generally compatible with sociological delineations of classes based like that of Savage and his collaborators upon the identification of clusters of economic, social and cultural characteristics within society. More than that, the integration of the two approaches to class into a single ontological and epistemological framework allows the weaknesses of each to be addressed. On the one hand, the real fragmentation of the ‘relational’ working class clearly bedevils attempts to develop an emancipatory politics of sufficiently wide appeal to mount a serious challenge to capitalism as it actually exists and as it is perceived. On the other hand, as noted at the outset, starting from the subjective attitudes and social practices of different segments of society makes it hard to see the wood for the trees -- to grasp the commonalities that are concealed by a hegemonic common sense centred on individual aspirations in relation to property and consumption.

Nowhere has this been more visible recently than in the frustrating inability of ‘the 99 per cent’ identified by the Occupy movement to develop from a visceral hostility to the remaining 1 per cent into a serious political challenge to neoliberalism. The newer slogans of the social movements seem to have little more purchase than the older ones of the traditional labour movement, even when the two are able to coalesce at least in identifying the object of their wrath, as they did for a few years following the Battle of Seattle in 1999. What is more, as the current crisis has gone on, the common experience of shock and dislocation following the financial crash has been replaced by marked differences in how the resolution of the crisis affects different groups: not only between employed and unemployed, or skilled and unskilled, but between different countries and regions. In Britain, the coalition government and most of the media have scapegoated welfare recipients (whether unemployed, or receiving incomes so low that they must be topped up with state benefits) and above all immigrants, in a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy. Meanwhile, German workers protected from austerity policies have shown little or no solidarity either with their less-protected fellow Germans, or with workers in the Eurozone ‘periphery’ whose governments have been blamed for the crisis and forced to impose unprecedented cuts in living standards and state provision alike. The differential economic impact of crisis policies on women has also been widely noted.<sup>34</sup> Across the globe, employers and governments alike beat the drum of ‘international competitiveness’: work harder and longer, do as you’re told, invest in skills (at your own expense) and then, just maybe, you can avoid losing your job to those industrious Chinese (Mexicans, Turks, etc.). Further, a crucial feature of capitalism in its modern neoliberal form is that the individualistic logic of competition is imposed far beyond the realm of capitalist production alone: such as within the higher education sector that employs many of you reading this, and even, it now seems, in the ‘production’ of protest.<sup>35</sup>

But this is the ideology of capital, the world seen from the standpoint of the law of value and the compulsion of profit. Meanwhile, within not only capitalist production, but also within the spheres of reproduction that lie outside the factory or office -- those that Fraser identifies as doubly hidden -- other forces are at work in contradiction to that ideology. In capitalist production, the relentless drive to deskill and control workers runs up, with equal necessity, against the capitalist’s unavoidable dependence upon human beings. In his critique of the Ehrenreichs’ thesis that the work of engineers essentially reproduces the pursuit of profit and thus the rule of capital, David Noble insisted on the continuing ideology of professionalism that remains rooted in the exercise of scientific and practical knowledge, and the non-pecuniary satisfactions obtained from such work.<sup>36</sup> Much further down the workplace status hierarchy, Paul Durrenberger and Dimitra Doukas have argued that a ‘gospel of work’ continues to act as a counterweight to the ‘gospel of wealth’ among the US working class.<sup>37</sup>

More generally, the apparently abstract concept of the ‘collective labourer’ developed by Marx in his analysis of machinery and modern industry does not simply represent, as many people claim, the strategy of ‘capital in command’; it also contains within it the necessity for elements of that collective labourer -- in other words, individual workers -- to combine their concrete activities creatively. Outside of the much-mythologized but rarely achieved ‘fully automated’ production process, most of us have to exercise our imagination and combine our talents with those of others in tasks from the most mundane to the most esoteric. If socialism is the ‘free association of producers’, then the capitalist workplace willy-nilly provides a foretaste of it. Nearly fifty years ago, in a relatively short chapter near the end of his study of Marx’s *Capital*, Roman Rosdolsky examined what he called ‘the historical limits of the law of value’.<sup>38</sup> He argued that contrary to the usual assertion that Marx was unwilling to make any predictions about a future socialist society, we ‘constantly encounter discussions and remarks in *Capital*, and the works preparatory to it, which are concerned with the problems of a socialist society’. His suggestion that Marx’s method both

directs our attention to the historical past, and posits the ‘historic presuppositions for a new state of society’, supports the idea that bridges can indeed be found towards socialism within everyday capitalist production.

What about the work of social reproduction that takes place in households, in recuperative leisure activities, or in voluntary associations of all kinds that supplement or even replace the state-funded provision of goods or services? Surely it demonstrates also the unavoidable dependence of tasks, however mandated and by whom, upon concrete labour that entails forethought, initiative and creativity by individuals, typically exercised in cooperation with others. Insofar as such forms of labour shift to and fro across the boundary between capitalist and non-capitalist production, there is little change in the concrete labour performed; what changes is whether it generates pecuniary reward, and how far that reward is diminished by the interposing of private capital in the production process.

We should therefore look upon the world of work -- by which I mean *all* kinds of work, not just that which takes place in the framework of capitalist wage-labour -- not only as an external and alienating form of subordination to the other. It is equally, as Marx put it, ‘the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase’.<sup>39</sup> But this very universality needs to be recognized, and to be seen as fundamental to the construction of a movement whose class purpose is, quite simply, the abolition of class society.

At this point we have to return to the vexed question of politics -- no longer a politics ‘of’ class or a ‘working-class politics’, but a politics *against* class. This requires, in the first place, that we stop being coy about our eventual purpose, and start to spell out what exactly we envisage as the constitutive features of a post-capitalist society. By breaking this down into a picture of social needs and creative activities under socialism which people can compare directly with their day-to-day experiences under capitalism, we can challenge the relentless drumbeat of ‘there is no alternative’. Capitalism is not a natural order, it is a social order; constructed by people in interaction with each other, it can equally be demolished and replaced. This is nothing more nor less than the original purpose of the Social Forum movement, to all appearances sidelined by the crisis of 2007-08 and its aftermath, but even at its most vigorous, bedevilled by the remnants of the failed party politics of the last century.

This leads to a second requirement: that we face up to the painful lessons of those failures. How can the grotesque inequalities of wealth and power in capitalism be challenged politically, if not by a robust insistence on the equal participation of all in any meaningful movement for change? This has to be rooted in the principles of citizenship and democracy that drove the pursuit of social justice in centuries past: there must be no more easy dismissal of ‘bourgeois democracy’, or insistence that enlightenment can only be brought to ‘the masses’ by a party élite. How many more attempts will be made to establish parties on the left in pursuit of the holy grail of a revolutionary politics that will brook no compromise with bourgeois politics? If we accept that bridges exist in day-to-day life that can help us to develop a popular and powerful movement for socialism, then there is nothing to be lost by working within existing organizations, whether parties, unions or social movements of all kinds. Given the compromises that we are forced to make every day of our lives, surely we can live with compromises in our political work; in many countries we have opportunities to do this in social democratic or green parties in which we will find people who share some vision of a better world. Above all, no amount of work to develop a more enlightening analysis of present-day capitalism is going to deliver a political awakening without a great deal of hard graft in the real world of compromised lives and confused aspirations. Perhaps it is time to read and write less, and instead plunge in to that world.

## NOTES

This essay is part of a larger project on the critique of political economy and the prospects for socialism (see the citations in footnotes 7, 17 and 37). For advice and encouragement I am grateful to Logie Barrow, Anthony Barzey, Paul Blackledge, Dave Byrne, David Camfield, Daniele Tepe-Belfraege, Alfredo Saad-Filho, the editors of the *Socialist Register* and members of the CSE Transpennine Working Group.

1 Mike Savage et al., 'A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the Great British Class Survey Experiment', *Sociology*, 47(2), 2013, p. 220.

2 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*, London: Allen Lane, 2009; Daniel Dorling, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Inequality*, Oxford: New Internationalist, 2012; George Irvin, *Super Rich: The Rise in Inequality in Britain and the United States*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.

3 See for example Owen Jones, *Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class*, London: Verso, 2011; and Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*, London: Bloomsbury, 2011.

4 Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction*, London: Routledge, 1984.

5 Furthermore, the methodology of the LSE/BBC survey has been severely criticized by Colin Mills, 'The Great British Class Fiasco: A Comment on Savage et al.', *Sociology*, 48(3), 2014, pp. 437-44.

6 Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.

7 Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and Vivek Chibber, 'Preface', *Socialist Register 2014: Registering Class*, London: Merlin Press, 2013, pp. ix-xi. This essay also draws on Hugo Radice, 'The Idea of Socialism: From 1968 to the Present-Day Crisis', *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography*, 41(S1), 2010, pp. 27-49; and 'The Prospects for Socialism: A Question of Capital and Class', in Henry Veltmeyer, ed., *21st-Century Socialism: Reinventing the Project*, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2011.

8 See Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright, *Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism*, 3rd edition, London: Central Books, 2013. On patriarchy in particular, see Heidi Hartmann, 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union', *Capital & Class*, 8, 1979, pp. 1-33.

9 See David Camfield, 'Re-Orienting Class Analysis: Working Classes as Historical Formations', *Science & Society*, 68(4), 2005, esp. pp. 421-30.

10 For broadly Marxist accounts of the debates see Pat Walker, ed., *Between Labour and Capital*, Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1979; Nicholas Abercrombie and John Urry, *Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1983; Bob Carter, *Capitalism, Class Conflict and the New Middle Class*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985; Erik Olin Wright, ed., *The Debate on Classes*, London: Verso, 1989; and Rosemary Crompton, *Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current Debates*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.

11 Thus Marx himself discusses the need in capitalist production, from its outset, for a 'special kind of wage-labourer' to supervise the work process: see Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970, p. 332.

12 See Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904; Adolf Berle and Gardner Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York: Macmillan, 1932; James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: Or, What is Happening in the World Now*, New York: John Day, 1941.

13 John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, London: Deutsch, 1972; Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.

14 Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich, 'The Professional-Managerial Class', *Radical America*, 11(2), 1977, pp. 7-31; and 'The New Left and the Professional-Managerial Class', *Radical America*, 11(3), 1977, pp. 7-22. Walker, *Between Labour and Capital*, includes critical assessments of their work by ten US left academics and activists. For other 'non-proletarianization' theses see Abercrombie and Urry, *Capital, Labour*, ch. 5.

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- 15 A notable example is Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, New York: Seabury Press, 1979; see also the survey by Charles Kurzman and Lynne Owens, 'The Sociology of Intellectuals', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 2002, pp. 63-90.
- 16 Hugo Radice, 'Marxism in Eastern Europe: From Socialist Dissidence to Capitalist Restoration', *Socialist History*, 42, 2012, pp. 43-59. For an integrated critical analysis of new class theories in capitalism and in Soviet socialism, see Lawrence King and Iván Széleányi, *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.
- 17 For example Harry Braverman, *Labour and Monopoly Capital*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974; and Guglielmo Carchedi, *On the Economic Identification of Social Classes*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. See also Abercrombie and Urry, *Capital, Labour*, ch. 4.
- 18 The neoliberal demise of the PMC has been acknowledged by Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich in 'Death of a Yuppie Dream: The Rise and Fall of the Professional-Managerial Class', New York: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2013, available at <http://www.rosalux-nyc.org>.
- 19 See notably Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis, eds, *Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Geoffrey Ingham has examined closely the forging of ruling class unity through the emerging hegemony of monetary wealth in *Capitalism*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008.
- 20 The concept of false consciousness cannot be attributed to Marx. See J. McCarney, 'Ideology and False Consciousness', 2005, available at <http://marxmyths.org>.
- 21 See Marx, *Capital*, Part IV, and for the rest of this paragraph, see esp. ch. XV, sec. 3, 4 and 8.
- 22 Marx, *Capital*, ch. XV, sec. 1.
- 23 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, 'The Dual Economics of Transition', in Conference of Socialist Economists, *The Labour Process and Class Strategies*, London: Stage 1, 1976, pp. 26-45; and *Economy and Class Structure of German Fascism*, London: CSE Books, 1978.
- 24 See D. T. N. Williamson, 'The Anachronistic Factory', *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, A/331(1585), 1972, pp. 131-60.
- 25 See for example André Gorz, ed., *The Division of Labour: The Labour Process and Class Struggle in Modern Capitalism*, Brighton: Harvester, 1976; Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain*, New York: Basic Books, 1979; Maxine Berg, ed., *Technology and Toil in Nineteenth Century Britain: Documents*, London: CSE Books, 1979.
- 26 Peter Meiksins, 'Beyond the Boundary Question', *New Left Review*, I/157, 1986, p. 110.
- 27 Camfield, 'Re-Orienting Class Analysis', p. 421. See also his more recent essay, 'Theoretical Foundations of an Anti-Racist Queer Feminist Historical Materialism', *Critical Sociology*, forthcoming.
- 28 For an excellent introduction to this question see Valerie Bryson, 'Production and Reproduction', in Georgina Blakely and Valerie Bryson, eds., *Marx and Other Four-Letter Words*, London: Pluto Press, 2005 (with thanks to Daniele Tepe-Belfraege for referring me to this source).
- 29 Nancy Fraser, 'Behind Marx's Hidden Abode: For an Expanded Conception of Capitalism', *New Left Review*, II/86, 2014, p. 56.
- 30 Fraser, 'Behind Marx's Hidden Abode', p. 59.
- 31 Fraser, 'Behind Marx's Hidden Abode', pp. 61-2.
- 32 This 'dialectics of labour' can also be understood as part of a historicist understanding of Marx, in which there is no sharp break found between his 'early' and 'mature' work. See Paul Walton and Andrew Gamble, *From Alienation to Surplus Value*, London: Sheed and Ward, 1972, esp. ch. 2, 'Alienation and the Dialectics of Labour', pp. 24-50.
- 33 This point is explored in Hugo Radice, 'Utopian Socialism and Marx's *Capital*: Envisioning Alternatives', in Lucia Pradella and Tom Marois, eds., *Polarizing Development: Alternatives to Neoliberalism and the Crisis*, Pluto Press, forthcoming.
- 34 See for example Jill Rubery and Anthony Rafferty, 'Women and Recession Revisited', *Work, Employment And Society*, 27(3), 2013, pp. 414-32.
- 35 On universities, see Andrew McGettigan, *The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of Higher Education*, London: Pluto Press 2013; on campaigning, see Peter Dauvergne and Genevieve LeBaron, *Protest Inc: The Corporatization of Activism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.
- 36 David Noble, 'The PMC: a Critique', in Walker, *Between Labour and Capital*, pp. 121-42.

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- 37 See E. Paul Durrenberger and Dimitra Doukas, ‘Gospel of Wealth, Gospel of Work: Counterhegemony in the US Working Class’, *American Anthropologist*, 110(2), 2008, pp. 214-25. For more on US working-class politics see Paul Durrenberger, *American Fieldnotes: Collected Essays of an Existentialist Anthropologist*, West Branch, Iowa: Draco Hill Press, 2013; and Michael Yates, *In and Out of the Working Class*, Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2009; and on the UK, Selina Todd, *The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class, 1910-2010*, London: John Murray, 2014.
- 38 Roman Rosdolsky, *The Making of Marx’s ‘Capital’*, London: Pluto Press, 1977, ch. 28 (originally published in German in 1968). The quotations below are at p. 414 (the second quotation is from Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973, p. 461). See also the comprehensive account of Marx’s concept of socialism in Peter Hudis, *Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013.
- 39 Marx, *Capital*, p. 184.